Using a small empirical model of in ‡ation, output, and money estimated on U.S. data, we compare the relative performance of monetary targeting and in ‡ation targeting. The results show monetary targeting to be quite ine¢cient, yielding both higher in ‡ation and output variability. This is true even with a nonstochastic money demand formulation. Our results are also robust to using a P* model of in ‡ation. Therefore, in these popular frameworks, there is no support for the prominent role given to money growth in the Eurosystem's monetary policy strategy.
Introduction
The recent formation of a new monetary institution in Europe has, once more, highlighted the question of the proper role for money in the conduct of monetary policy. In the past few years, particularly during the gestation of the European Central Bank (ECB), a lively debate has considered whether monetary targeting or in ‡ation targeting would be the most appropriate monetary strategy for the Eurosystem. 1 This debate was only spurred on by the Eurosystem's announcement of its actual monetary strategy, which was described in the inaugural issue of the ECB's Monthly Bulletin [11, p. 9] :
. . . [T] he strategy is based on two pillars. The …rst consists in a prominent role for money, as signalled by the announcement of a quantitative reference value of 4-1/2 percent for the growth rate of the broad monetary aggregate M3 which is regarded as being compatible with price stability. The second comprises a broadly based assessment of the outlook for price developments and the risks to price stability using …nancial and other economic indicators.
This strategy appears to be a combination of a weak type of monetary targeting and an implicit form of in ‡ation targeting. It is only a weak type of monetary targeting because the Eurosystem has rejected a simple formulation in which money growth is an intermediate target variable to always be brought in line with the reference value. Nevertheless, the Eurosystem has made it clear that deviations of money growth from the reference value will be treated as a major factor in its policy decisions. The second pillar contains the basic thrust of in ‡ation targeting; however, some of the important elements of an explicit in ‡ation targeting strategy, such as the public comparison of an in ‡ation forecast to an announced target, are absent.
In order to understand the potential for the success of this mixed strategy for monetary policy, this paper evaluates the relative performance of monetary targeting and in ‡ation targeting. This exercise provides, in a loose sense, some evidence of the relative value of the …rst and second pillars of Eurosystem strategy. Previous analysis in Svensson [42] , [43] , and [45] provides a theoretical case for favoring in ‡ation targeting over monetary targeting. In this paper, we provide an empirical counterpart to this analysis using a small estimated model of in ‡ation, output, and money.
Of course, an important di¢culty for our analysis, or indeed any empirical investigation of the policy choice faced by the Eurosystem, is the lack of a data set with which to estimate an empirical model of the euro-area economy. The nations of the euro area have been bound together with a common currency for only a very short period, so using appropriate post-union euro-area data for model estimates is not an option. Constructing synthetic pre-union aggregates from the separate historical data for the euro-area countries is one alternative. 2 This, of course, is an ambiguous counter-factual exercise. National statistics with di¤ering de…nitions must be aggregated, and some accounting must be made of the actual historical exchange rate ‡uctuations among the 11 euro-area countries. Furthermore, even if unambiguous pre-union aggregates were available, it is not clear that the experience of the euro area before monetary union under ‡oating exchange rates and with a variety of monetary policy regimes and institutions would be appropriate for analyzing the post-union euro area under the Eurosystem. Thus, reconstructed historical euro-area data will be an uncertain guide to the future. The experience of the United States is, in our opinion, at least as relevant a guide. It is often noted that the euro area has many similarities to the United States, not only in terms of monetary union, but also in terms of economic size and the relative importance of external trade. Accordingly, in analyzing the relative value of monetary targeting and in ‡ation targeting, we use coe¢cients in our model that are estimated using U.S. data. We certainly cannot guarantee that this empirical model, which is merely a rudimentary approximation of the U.S. economy, is the correct vehicle for analyzing euro-area monetary policy in the future; however, as outlined in the next section, we think that our model has some desirable attributes even from a European perspective. Still, a major caveat to our analysis is that the economy in the euro area under the Eurosystem may behave substantially di¤erently from the U.S. experience (or from a reconstructed euro-area history). 3 With that caveat clearly established, our results from a model …t to the U.S. economy are used to draw some lessons for the Eurosystem. Our results show that monetary targeting is much more ine¢cient, in the sense of inducing more variable in ‡ation and output, than in ‡ation targeting. We get this result even after excluding parts of the sample period so as to estimate a very well-behaved, nonstochastic money-demand equation. Furthermore, this result holds even if we assume that there are no stochastic shocks at all a¤ecting money demand. Thus, counter to conventional wisdom, monetary targeting is ine¢cient even if money demand is stable and controllable. This result re ‡ects the fact that the dynamics of money's relationship to the rest of the economy makes money growth a poor predictor of future in ‡ation (in the sense that the correlation between money growth and in ‡ation forecasts is quite low). Thus, money growth is an inadequate indicator of risks to price stability. All this provides substantial empirical con…rmation of the theoretical arguments in Svensson [42] , [43] , and [45] .
Interestingly, we also …nd that monetary targeting is inferior when we modify the traditional model of the transmission mechanism (with its standard aggregate-demand, aggregate-supply, and money-demand functions) and include a direct role for money in the aggregate-supply equation. In particular, we replace the traditional output gap by a "price gap" as in the P ¤ model (see Hallman, Porter, and Small [17] ) or, equivalently, by a "real money gap" (the di¤erence between actual real balances and long-run equilibrium real balances, see Svensson [46] and Gerlach and Svensson [14] ). In such a situation, a monetary aggregate (in the form of the real money gap) is a direct determinant of future in ‡ation, and control of the real money gap is hence crucial. Still, this link between money and in ‡ation does not mean that an intermediate money-growth target is the best way to control in ‡ation. Intuitively, although the real money gap may be a crucial input for a conditional in ‡ation forecast, that in ‡ation forecast will not have a one-to-one relationship to current nominal money growth. Therefore, current nominal money growth is not a good forecast of future in ‡ation, and monetary targeting is not an e¢cient way to maintain low and stable in ‡ation.
That said, there may be certain situations, for instance, a hyperin ‡ation, where moneygrowth targeting is a simple and e¤ective minimum-information strategy for bringing in ‡ation down to more moderate levels. Indeed, in a hyperin ‡ation, current money growth alone may be a su¢cient predictor of future in ‡ation. However, in normal circumstances, it appears that one can do much better by abandoning money-growth targeting for in ‡ation targeting.
Section 2 presents the model and the empirical estimates. Section 3 reports the results on the relative performance of in ‡ation targeting and monetary targeting. We also show that nominal GDP targeting-a close relative to monetary targeting-would be quite ine¢cient compared to in ‡ation targeting. In section 3, we consider the alternative model that incorporates a P* equation for in ‡ation, which has had some empirical success in both the U.S. (Hallman, Porter, and Small [17] ) and in the euro area (Gerlach and Svensson [14] ). However, even with the enhanced role for money in the P* model, we …nd no support for money-growth targeting, which provides empirical con…rmation of the theoretical results of Svensson [46] . Section 4 discusses the lessons for the Eurosystem. Section 5 presents some conclusions.
2. An Empirical Model of U.S. Output, In ‡ation, and Money
Aggregate supply and demand
The two equations for output and in ‡ation used for our baseline analysis, which are fully described in Rudebusch and Svensson [37] , are
where ¼ t is quarterly in ‡ation in the GDP chain-weighted price index (P t ) in percent at an annual rate, i.e., ¼ t´4 (p t ¡ p t¡1 ), where p t = 100 ln P t , ¹ ¼ t is four-quarter in ‡ation in the GDP chain-weighted price index, i.e., 1 4 § 3 j=0 ¼ t¡j , ¹ { t is the four-quarter average federal funds rate, i.e., 1 4 § 3 j=0 i t¡j (where i t is the quarterly average federal funds rate in percent per year), and y t is the output gap, the relative gap between actual real GDP (Q t ) and potential GDP (Q ¤ t ) in percent, i.e., 100(Q t ¡ Q ¤ t )=Q ¤ t (approximately q t ¡ q ¤ t , where q t´1 00 ln Q t and q ¤ t´1 00 ln Q ¤ t are log GDP and log potential GDP scaled by 100, respectively). The series on potential GDP (Q ¤ t ) is obtained from the Congressional Budget O¢ce [8] . The constant ¹ r is the average real interest rate, and " t and´t are iid shocks with variances ¾ 2 " and ¾ 2 . The …ve variables were de-meaned prior to estimation, so no constantsappear in the equations and ¹ r is set equal to zero. The equations were estimated individually by OLS. 4 The hypothesis that the sum of the lag coe¢cients of in ‡ation equals one had a p-value of .48, so this restriction was imposed in 4 The estimates are slightly di¤erent from those in Rudebusch and Svensson [37] because of data revisions and a longer sample.
estimation. Thus, this is an accelerationist form of the Phillips curve, which implies a long-run vertical Phillips curve. 5 Three considerations motivate the use of this model: simplicity, congruence with actual central bank models, and empirical …t to the data.. In particular, although its simple structure facilitates the production of benchmark results, as described by Rudebusch and Svensson [37] , this model also appears to roughly capture the views about the dynamics of the economy held by many monetary policymakers. The empirical …t of the model is also quite good compared, for example, to an unrestricted VAR. Indeed, the model can be interpreted as a restricted VAR, where the restrictions imposed are not at odds with the data as judged, for example, with standard model information criteria (see Rudebusch and Svensson [37] ). 6 Finally, the model appears to be stable over various subsamples-an important condition for drawing inferences. With a backward-looking model, the Lucas Critique may apply with particular force, so it is important to gauge its historical importance with econometric stability tests (Oliner, Rudebusch, and Sichel [30] 
Adding money to the model
Money could be added to the aggregate supply and demand model described above in a variety of ways. The same considerations a¤ecting our selection of equations (2.1) and (2.2) motivte our choice of a model with money. Perhaps most importantly, we add money to the model not as a "straw man", but as a feature that is consistent with the views of monetary policymakers. 7 As a general characterization, central bankers typically hold the view that movements in the monetary aggregates play essentially no role in the direct quarter-by-quarter determination of either output or prices; however, many policymakers also concede that money may have some 5 Using reconstructed historical euro-area data, this model has been estimated by Peersman and Smets [32] and Taylor [50] . They have obtained coe¢cient estimates that are close to our U.S. ones, although with lower in ‡ation persistence. 6 Söderström [40] scrutinizes the Rudebusch-Svensson model further. 7 Our analysis of money will be most convincing to central bankers (including those in the Eurosystem, who are, of course, among the most important ultimate consumers of this research) if we use a model that is similar to those actually employed in central banks.
value as an indicator of economic developments (e.g., Meyer [27] In most of the central banks' macroeconometric models the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is modelled as an interest rate transmission process. The central bank sets the short-term interest rate, which in ‡uences interest rates over the whole maturity spectrum, other asset prices, and the exchange rate. These changes in …nancial variables then a¤ect output and prices through the di¤erent spending components. The role of money is in most cases a passive one, in the sense that money is demand determined.
Our model will incorporate money in an identical fashion. The alternative, where money plays a direct role in output or in ‡ation determination separate from interest rates, has little support among central banks or in the data. 8 For example, Gerlach and Smets [13] …t small (output, in ‡ation, and interest rate) VARs to each of the G7 countries and state: "In preliminary work we incorporated monetary aggregates (M3 or M2) in the analysis, but found that they appear largely determined by money demand shocks that in turn have little, if any, impact on the economy" (p. 191). Similarly, in our AD-AS structural model, lags of nominal money (in levels or growth rates) were insigni…cant when added to equations (2.1) and (2.2).
The most important exception to this general lack of interest in incorporating money directly into an AD-AS model is the P ¤ model of Hallman, Porter, and Small [17] . This model, which is still only rarely used, has been estimated with reconstructed euro-area data in Gerlach and
Svensson [14] . Results with an alternative P ¤ in ‡ation equation will be examined separately in section 3.3 below.
Instead, following the mainstream, we add money to our model with a separate moneydemand equation, which is cast in a standard error-correction form. The long-run money-demand function is
where m t is the log of real M2 (scaled by 100), i.e., 100 ln
M2t
Pt . In the long run, the demand for 8 There are two primary channels for the quantity of money to a¤ect aggregate demand directly: a real balance e¤ect and a bank lending channel. The lack of U.S. evidence for either of these two channels is noted in, respectively, Reifschneider, et al. [34] and Oliner and Rudebusch [29] . Meltzer [26] and Nelson [28] …nd evidence of an e¤ect of real money on aggregate demand; the latter interprets this as a proxy for an e¤ect via a long interest rate. The weak contribution of money in predicting in ‡ation is described in Estrella and Mishkin [10] and Stock and Watson [41] .
real money moves one-for-one with real output 9 and negatively with respect to the interest rate (a proxy for the opportunity cost of money 10 ), so · i , the long-run interest rate semielasticity, is positive. The short-run money-demand equation takes the form
where ¢m t+1´mt+1 ¡ m t is the growth rate of real money measured in percent per quarter, and » t is an iid shock with variance ¾ 2 » . Assuming that the stock of real money adjusts to its long-run average, q t ¡ · i i t , the error-correction coe¢cient · m should be positive.
Before providing estimates of the money demand equation, it is instructive to examine the long-run equilibrium condition (2.5). Figure 2 .1 shows the log of M2 velocity (that is, v tq t ¡ m t ) and the interest rate (i t ). According to condition (2.5), these two variables should move together so that their di¤erence is stationary. For most of the sample, this clearly appears to be the case (and, for example, Hallman, Porter and Small [17] provide supporting statistical evidence). In the 1990s, however, there was a dramatic increase in velocity, and the historical long-run relationship obviously broke down. The cause of this upward shift in velocity is still debated, but it is likely linked to the increased availability and liquidity of bond and stock mutual funds. These factors may have triggered a signi…cantly larger role for such mutual funds in household portfolio choice and as a payment vehicle. 11 In any case, we estimate a money demand equation just over the relatively stable three decades before 1991, and our subsequent rule evaluations are based on this equation (along with (2.3) and (2.4)). We restrict the money demand sample because the 1990s may re ‡ect special conditions in the evolution of U.S. …nancial institutions that are not relevant for Europe.
Thus, our analysis assumes a stable money demand relationship like the one experienced by the U.S. before 1991. However, the following caveat must be stressed: given the potential for large structural shifts in Europe, especially after the shift to a monetary union, our results, which ignore the structural shift in money demand that has already occurred in the U.S., will clearly 9 When tested, we could not reject a unitary income elasticity (the p-value is .16), so it is imposed. This is consistent with previous empirical investigations, such as Feldstein and Stock [12] and Porter and Small [33] .
1 0 Models of money with more institutional detail calculate the opportunity cost as the di¤erence between the alternative rate for assets that are substitutes to money and the own-rate on money deposits. In the U.S., the alternative rate is typically a short-term rate like a 3-month Treasury bill rate, and the own-rate is the average rate on deposits in money market deposit accounts, small time deposit accounts, and so forth (e.g., Porter and Small [33] ). However, since deposit rates are quite sluggish, much of the variation in such an opportunity cost can be captured with just the alternative rate, which, in our case, is proxied by the funds rate. (See, for example, …gure 3 in Porter and Small [33] .) In contrast, some studies employ the short rate as the own rate and a long-term market interest rate as the alternative rate (e.g., Hamburger [18] ). However, simply enlarging our structural model to include a rational expectations model of the long-term yield is likely insu¢cient (see Hess, Jones, and Porter [19] ), and modeling the relevant term premia are well beyond the scope of our investigation. 1 1 See discussion by Mehra [25] and Orphanides and Porter [31] . We estimate the long-and short-run money demand equations jointly in (2.6). Compared with other structural estimates of money demand in the literature, (2.7) appears to be a simple but reasonable representation. 12 The value of the error correction coe¢cient (· m )
indicates that about 11 percent of the gap from the long-run equilibrium is closed each quarter. This is essentially the same convergence rate estimated by Mehra [25] and by Porter and Small [33] with more detailed money demand models. In addition, these authors provide estimates of the dynamic responses and the interest rate semi-elasticity of money that are also quite close to our own (· i = 1:25) (after accounting for our scaling of m t ). 13 Finally, as noted above, structural stability is an important condition for drawing policy inferences. Given the spectacular failures that have littered this …eld (e.g., the collapse of the 1 2 Estimates of such error correction money demand equations using reconstructed historical euro-area aggregates are surveyed in Browne, Fagan, and Henry [5] . The associated coe¢cient estimates appear to be broadly in line with our U.S. estimates. 1 3 The data determine the time pro…le of responses of money and other variables. Graphs of impulse responses show that money responds quicker to instrument changes than in ‡ation and output.
Baba, Hendry, and Starr [3] model described in Hess, Jones, and Porter [19] ), we only humbly note that over our shortened sample, the stability of our money demand equation is not rejected by the Andrews test (described above). Speci…cally, the maximum value of the likelihood-ratio test statistic for structural stability over all possible breakpoints is 9.91 (in 1981:1), while the 10 percent critical value is 12.27 (from Table 1 in Andrews [2] ).
The loss function and the optimal policy
Equations (2.1), (2.2), and (2.6) provide the aggregate supply, aggregate demand, and moneydemand equations of the empirical model of the U.S. economy. To complete the model, we specify the relationship among output, the output gap, and potential output,
and we assume that potential output is a random walk,
where µ t+1 is an iid shock with variance ¾ 2 µ and mean ¹ µ representing the upward growth of the economy.
We further specify a loss function that allows us to compare in ‡ation targeting and moneygrowth targeting in a convenient way. We assume that the relevant target variable under moneygrowth targeting is the four-quarter money growth rate, ¹ t , de…ned as
(recall that m t is (log) real money). For convenience we set the in ‡ation target and the moneygrowth targets to zero, so ¼ t , ¹ ¼ t and ¹ t can be interpreted as deviations from the target. We then assume the loss functioņ
where the parameters¸¼;¸y;¸¹;¸¢ i¸0 are the weights on in ‡ation stabilization around the in ‡ation target, output-gap stabilization, money-growth stabilization around the money-growth target, and interest-rate smoothing, respectively. We normalize the weights to sum to one.
Throughout, we assume the weight¸¢ i = 0:2, which corresponds to the standard weight on interest-rate smoothing in Rudebusch and Svensson [37] . Given the weight on interest-rate smoothing, we here de…ne ‡exible in ‡ation targeting (FIT) as¸¼ =¸y = 0:4,¸¹ = 0; strict in ‡ation targeting (SIT) as¸¼ = 0:8,¸y =¸¹ = 0; strict output-gap targeting (SOT) as¸y = 0:8, ¼ =¸¹ = 0; and strict money-growth targeting (SMT) as¸¹ = 0:8,¸¼ =¸y = 0. 14 Flexible in ‡ation targeting corresponds to the standard case examined in Rudebusch and Svensson [37] .
Minimizing the loss function (2.11) for given weights and the model (2.1), (2.2) and (2.6)-(2.10), results in an optimal reaction function
where f is a row vector and X t is a vector of the state variables. Then the variances of the goal variables are easily calculated. 15 By varying the weights, we can calculate the reaction function and the variances of the goal variables for each targeting case. We use the empirical parameters of (2.1), (2.2) and (2.6), with ¾ " = 1:08; ¾´= 0:82 and ¾ » = 0:70. The actual ¾ µ for our potential output series is equal to 0:19; however, since this series is essentially a segmented deterministic trend with infrequent breaks, we set ¾ µ equal to zero, which we interpret as corresponding to a …xed trend. 16 Thus, we represent the di¤erent targeting regimes as the minimization of speci…ed loss functions. Assigning a speci…c loss function to be minimized by the central bank is a (general)
targeting rule in the terminology of Rudebusch and Svensson [37] , Svensson [43] and Svensson and Woodford [48] . We do not here specify how the central bank makes this minimization operational. One technique, described in Svensson [42] and [43] , is (general) " ‡exible in ‡ation-forecast targeting," where the central bank, at regular decision points, selects an instrument path such that conditional in ‡ation and output-gap forecasts (conditional on available information about the state of the economy, the central bank's view of the transmission mechanism and the instrument path) minimize the loss function, and then follows that instrument path until the next decision point. Another technique is to specify conditions, "speci…c" targeting rules, that the conditional forecasts shall ful…ll, and then select the instrument path so that the corresponding in ‡ation and output-gap forecasts ful…ll the desired conditions. These targeting rules imply endogenous reaction functions. Rudebusch and Svensson [37] examine a few alternative targeting rules of this kind for the above empirical model of the U.S. economy and show that such rules can result in loss levels fairly close to the optimal loss (see table 5 .3 in [37] , for instance the and money-growth stabilization, the corresponding combination of in ‡ation and output-gap variance will be in the interior of the area enclosed by the three curves in …gure 3.1. Thus, when there is some positive weight on money-growth stabilization, the resulting combination of in ‡ation and output-gap variability will be ine¢cient. The …rst four rows in table 1 
Reasons for the ine¢ciency of money-growth targeting
As we can see from …gure 3.1 and 
The reaction function for monetary targeting is clearly quite di¤erent from the reaction function under ‡exible in ‡ation targeting, in that the interest rate in the latter case depends (with sizeable coe¢cients) on current and lagged real money stocks. 17 Is this di¤erence in reaction functions su¢cient to make money-growth targeting ine¢cient for a nonstochastic money-demand function (that is, without money-demand shocks) as well?
We can examine this by setting the variance of the money-demand shocks equal to zero, ¾ 2 » = 0. The result of strict money-growth targeting with nonstochastic money demand is shown in row 5 in table 1 and can be compared to row 4, with money-demand shocks. Whereas the variance of money growth is substantially lower without money-demand shocks, 18 the variances of in ‡ation and the output gap-as well as the overall loss-are only slightly lower in row 5 with nonstochastic money demand than in row 4. It follows that the point SMT would only shift slightly to the southwest in …gure 3.1, so that the …gure would look very similar with nonstochastic money demand. Thus, the ine¢ciency of monetary targeting is not due to the instability of money demand. Instead, it is due to the form of the dynamic money-demand function and the resulting reaction function. 19 1 7 Taylor [49] observes that money-growth targeting would imply a particular reaction function. He concludes, however, that the reaction would not di¤er too much from the Taylor rule, in that it would make the interest rate a function of in ‡ation and output. However, as we can see, the reaction function under monetary targeting is actually quite di¤erent from the Taylor rule in its dependence on current and lagged real money stocks. 1 8 Readers may wonder why the variance of money growth is not zero under strict monetary targeting with stable money demand. The reasons are twofold. First, it is the demand for real money that is stable, so nominal money growth still varies with in ‡ation. Second, the weight on interest-rate smoothing implies that money growth is stabilized somewhat less than what is feasible. 1 9 The structure of the reaction function is further examined in an appendix available at the authors' websites. Finally, the most direct intuition for why money-growth targeting does not stabilize in ‡ation follows from the identity (2.10), rewritten as
where ¢ 4 m t´mt ¡ m t¡4 is four-quarter real money growth. If the variance of real money growth ¢ 4 m t were small, stable money growth, ¹ t , would imply stable in ‡ation, ¹ ¼ t . However, with an empirical money-demand function like (2.6), the variance of real money growth is far from small, as the column for Var ¢ 4 m t in table 1 shows. Even with a nonstochastic moneydemand function, row 5, money-growth targeting implies substantial variability in real money growth and, hence, in in ‡ation.
Nominal GDP targeting
Nominal GDP targeting has been promoted by Gordon [15] and McCallum [22] and [23] . We can easily examine nominal GDP targeting in the present framework. 20 Let us assume that the relevant target variable is four-quarter nominal GDP growth, g t , de…ned as Dennis [9] , and Guender [16] . Since monetary policy a¤ects output with a shorter lag than it does for in ‡ation, nominal GDP growth can be stabilized by output adjustments at a relatively short horizon when in ‡ation is predetermined. These output adjustments, in turn, lead to highly variable in ‡ation, which then requires even higher output variability in order to stabilize nominal GDP growth. Only a positive weight on interest-rate smoothing prevents complete instability. 21 
An alternative P* model of in ‡ation
The model used above, which has no direct role for money in determining output or in ‡ation, does have the advantage of capturing to some approximation the views of many central bankers, including those at the ECB. In particular, although the ECB has no current o¢cial model, many researchers at the ECB and elsewhere use a model similar to the one above (e.g., Coenen
and Wieland [7] and Peersman and Smets [32] ).) As noted above, these views are shaped by 2 0 The required modi…cations of the model are detailed in an appendix at the authors' websites. For an analysis of rules that respond to nominal output growth (rather than nominal output targeting), see Rudebusch [35] . 2 1 Jensen [21] …nds that " ‡exible" nominal income growth targeting (that is, with a separate weight on output gap stabilizatin) performs well (in terms of in ‡ation and output-gap variability) in a model with a forward-looking Phillips curve. The reason is quite intricate. Nominal income growth as a target variable under discretion makes the policy response depend on lagged output. This makes the policy response more intertial, which brings it closer to the optimal response under commitment. the data. It is very di¢cult to …nd signi…cant, stable, direct e¤ects of money on the economy. For example, even over the short sample from 1961 to 1990, including several lags of quarterly money growth makes no signi…cant contribution to explaining in ‡ation.
An alternative model with money that appears to have some empirical success is the P* model of in ‡ation of Hallman, Porter, and Small [17] (see Svensson [46] for a recent discussion):
where p ¤ t´m t + v ¤ t ¡ q ¤ t is the long-run equilibrium price level and v ¤ t is the long-run equilibrium value of (log) velocity (that is, resulting from output equal to potential output and the interest rate equal to its long-run equilibrium value). As noted above, for the 1961 to 1990 period in the U.S., velocity is stationary, so v ¤ t is a constant, v ¤ . The rationale for the P ¤ model is that in a stable long-run equilibrium where output grows at potential and velocity has stabilized at its equilibrium, the quantity equation indicates that the aggregate price level must equal p ¤ t . Two transformations of the price gap help illuminate the relationship of the P* equation 
Thus, if velocity remains fairly close to its long-run equilibrium value, the negative of the price gap matches the output gap, and the P* model reduces to a standard Phillips curve in terms of the output gap. As shown in …gure 2.1, velocity remained relatively close to its long-run average except during the 1990s. The 1990s therefore provide a test of the relative value of the Phillips curve and P* models, and, as discussed below, it is a test that the P* model fails. A second interesting transformation of the price gap (noted in Whitesell [51] and Svensson [46] Not surprisingly then, the P* model performs similarly to the Phillips curve during this sample: Indeed, at the crude aggregate level that we are working at and over this short sample, there is little to choose from empirically between (3.3) and (2.3). 22 However, even over this short sample, there is some sign of structural instability in (3.3). The Andrews [2] maximum likelihood-ratio test statistic is 15.14 (in 1972:2), which is signi…cant at the 10 percent critical value (although not the 5 percent level).
More seriously, the P* model displays much greater instability in the 1990s. After 1990, the output gap and the real money gap diverge greatly (their correlation in this subsample is ¡ :94).
However, it is not the case that the unique information in the real money gap better explained the behavior of in ‡ation in the 1990s. In terms of predictive accuracy, using the short-sample estimates of the P* model in (3.3) to forecast in ‡ation in the 1990s gives disastrous results (see, for instance, …gure 6 of Orphanides and Porter [31] ). This problem re ‡ects a shift during the 1990s of the U.S. long-run equilibrium level of velocity, v ¤ , that was unforecastable and, even now, somewhat inexplicable. Of course, it is always possible to de…ne a v ¤ such that the P* model …ts the data; however, the key failing of the P* model for real-time forecasting and policy analysis is that it requires contemporaneous estimates of both q ¤ t and v ¤ . (For further discussion of real-time policy analysis, see Rudebusch [35] and Christiano [6] .) Still, as with our analysis of money demand above, we can limit ourselves to the short sample where the P* model performs well. This system, which represents an extreme best case scenario for supporting money-growth targeting, comprises equations (3.3), (2.4), and (2.7). Despite the substantial monetary character of this model, a positive weight on money-growth stabilization results in an ine¢cient combination of in ‡ation and output-gap variability, as shown in table 2. 23 This result holds even with a nonstochastic money demand. 
Lessons for the Eurosystem 4.1. A lesson about money-growth targeting
Above, we have shown in a simple empirical model that money-growth targeting can be quite ine¢cient, in the sense that it induces highly variable in ‡ation or output. As noted in the introduction, the monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem assigns a prominent role to money growth. In particular, the deviation of current M3 growth from a reference value is interpreted as an indicator of the risk to price stability. However, the Eurosystem has rejected monetary targeting by emphasizing that money growth will not be an intermediate target to be brought in line with the reference value. Issing [20] is quite explicit on this:
[ Future shifts in the velocity of money are certainly possible-perhaps even likely.
They cannot be predicted with certainty. Moreover, it is not clear whether those aggregates that have the best results in terms of stability are su¢ciently controllable in the short-term with the policy instruments available to the ESCB. In these circumstances, relying on a pure monetary targeting strategy would constitute an unrealistic, and therefore misguided, commitment.
Thus, according to Issing, the Eurosystem has rejected monetary targeting for the euro area on the grounds that money demand is likely to be unstable and not su¢ciently controllable. The implication seems to be that, if euro money demand had been found to be stable and su¢ciently The empirical demand function for U.S. M2 that we have estimated is quite well-behaved.
By excluding the period after 1991 from the sample, we obtain a relatively stable money-demand function with a good …t and small money-demand shocks. Furthermore, money is quite controllable in this equation, with a semielasticity of one-quarter-ahead real and nominal money with respect to the federal funds rate given by · m · i = :135. Nevertheless, even with this well-behaved money demand function, money-growth targeting would be very ine¢cient in the U.S. Even if we were to set the money-demand shocks equal to zero and make the money-demand equation completely nonstochastic, the e¢ciency of money-growth targeting would improve only slightly.
Similarly, if the euro-area economy can be reasonably well described by a system of equations not too dissimilar from our model (as argued in the introduction), we must conclude that money-growth targeting by the Eurosystem is likely to be quite ine¢cient, even under the extreme assumption of completely nonstochastic money demand. Thus, one main lesson for the Eurosystem seems to be that it would be wise to continue rejecting money-growth targeting, regardless of whether the demand for euro M3 is nonstochastic or not, and regardless of how controllable it is.
A lesson about the money-growth indicator
Even though the Eurosystem has rejected money-growth targeting, it maintains that the moneygrowth indicator is a crucial indicator for its policy goal of price stability. Indeed, since the money-growth indicator has been elevated to be one of the two "pillars" supporting Eurosystem monetary policy, the impression is that the Eurosystem will give it at least the same weight as its internal in ‡ation forecasts. Svensson [45] and [47] has criticized the emphasis on the money-growth indicator and argued that it is likely to be a poor indicator of the risk to price stability. In e¤ect, on theoretical grounds, it appears to be mainly a noisy indicator of current in ‡ation rather than a good predictor of future in ‡ation at horizons relevant for monetary policy decisions.
Can we say anything about the likely performance of the money-growth indicator from the empirical model in this paper? The issue boils down to how well money growth predicts future in ‡ation. We examine this by calculating the correlation between money growth and two di¤erent in ‡ation forecasts. 24 First, we have the "unchanged-interest-rate" forecast of fourquarter in ‡ation T quarters ahead, denoted ¹ ¼ t+T;t (i t¡1 ). This is the forecast conditional on an unchanged interest rate, i t+¿ = i t¡1 for ¿¸0, and the current state of the economy. Svensson [45] argues that the best indicator of the risk to price stability is the deviation between an unchanged-interest-rate forecast and the in ‡ation target. This indicator obviously signals by how much the in ‡ation target is likely to be missed if there is no policy adjustment. It also signals the direction and the magnitude of the optimal instrument adjustment. Then, the correlation of current money growth with the unchanged-interest-rate forecast for di¤erent horizons should be a good measure of the performance of the money-growth indicator. Second, we have the "equilibrium" forecast of four-quarter in ‡ation T quarters ahead, denoted ¹ ¼ t+T jt . This is the forecast conditional on the optimal reaction function (2.12) and the current state of the economy.
The correlation coe¢cients for the correlation of current monetary growth with unchanged- 25 We see that for longer horizons, the correlation is higher with unchangedinterest-rate in ‡ation forecasts than for equilibrium forecasts. Still, the correlation is quite low and does not exceed .3. For horizons around 8 quarters, which are often referred to as most relevant for monetary policy, the correlation coe¢cients are as low as .13 or . 16 . We conclude that the money-growth indicator is indeed a poor indicator of risks to price stability. Thus, with regard to the properties of money growth in the euro area, the main lesson is that it is likely to be a rather inferior indicator of future in ‡ation.
Conclusions
Using an empirical model of U.S. in ‡ation, output, and money, we compare the performance of monetary targeting relative to in ‡ation targeting. We exclude the period after 1990, when M2 money demand displayed considerable instability, from the sample period for the moneydemand estimation. As a result, our estimated money-demand equation is quite well-behaved with moderate money-demand shocks and controllable money demand. it to the status of one of two pillars supporting its monetary policy, the other pillar being the Eurosystem's internal in ‡ation forecast. There seems to be no support for that elevation of the money-growth indicator. Our results indicate that the money-growth indicator has quite low correlation with both the unchanged-interest-rate and equilibrium in ‡ation forecasts. Therefore, money growth is likely to be a poor indicator of risks to price stability. Thus, money growth
should not be one of two pillars; rather, it should, at most, be one brick among many in the construction of in ‡ation and output-gap forecasts that will be the crucial input in the Eurosystem's monetary policy decisions.
In passing, we have also shown that nominal GDP targeting, in our empirical model of the U.S. economy, would be an even more ine¢cient policy than monetary targeting. Since monetary policy realistically a¤ects output with a shorter lag than it does in ‡ation, nominal GDP growth can be stabilized by output adjustments at a relatively short horizon, for which in ‡ation is predetermined. These output adjustments, in turn, lead to high variability of in ‡ation, which then requires even higher output variability in order to stabilize nominal GDP growth. For a discount factor ±, 0 < ± < 1, we consider the intertemporal loss function in quarter t,
where the period loss function is
When ± ! 1, the loss function (A.1) with (A.2) approaches E[L t ] which equals (2.11).
The model (2.1), (2.2) and (2.6)-(2.9) has a convenient state-space representation,
e j (j = 0; 1; :::; 15) denotes a 1£15 row vector, for j = 0 with all elements equal to zero, for j = 1; :::; 15 with element j equal to unity and all other elements equal to zero; and where e j:k (j < k) denotes a 1£15 row vector with elements j; j + 1; :::; k equal to 1 4 and all other elements equal to zero. Furthermore, it is convenient to de…ne the 4£1 vector Y t of goal variables. It ful…lls
where the vector Y t , the 4£15 matrix C X and the 4£1 column vector C i are given by : Then, the period loss function can be written
where the 4£4 matrix K has the diagonal (¸¼;¸y;¸¹;¸¢ i ) and all its o¤-diagonal elements are equal to zero.
With (A.3), (A.1) and (A.2), the problem is written in a form convenient for the standard stochastic linear regulator problem (cf. Chow [1] and Sargent [2] ). Minimizing (A.1) in each quarter, subject to (A.3) and the current state of the economy, X t , results in a linear feedback rule for the instrument of the form (2.12). More precisely, the optimal instrument rule is the vector f in (2.12) that ful…lls
where the 15 £ 15 matrix V ful…lls the Riccati equation
where M is the transition matrix given by (A.10) and Q, U and R are given by
Furthermore, the optimal value of (A.1) is
(1 ¡ ±)X 0 t V X t + ± trace (V § uu ) ; (A.6)
where § uu = E [u t u 0 t ] is the covariance matrix of the disturbance vector. In the limit when ± approaches 1, the optimal rule converges to the one minimizing (2.11) and the optimal value of B. The P ¤ model
In the P ¤ model, the …rst row in matrix A, A 1¢ , is simply replaced by
® ¼j e j + ® m e 10 ¡ ® m e 15 .
All other equations remain the same.
C. Strict monetary targeting without interest-rate smoothing
Consider strict monetary targeting without interest-rate smoothing,¸¹ = 1 and¸¼ =¸y = ¢i = 0. We realize that a …rst-order condition for a minimum of (A.1) is then simply
where for any variable x t , x t+¿ jt denotes the expectation of x t+¿ conditional on the information available in period t, that is, X t and i t . From (2.6) and (2.10), we get
Combining this with (C.1), solving for i t and using (2.1) gives
Using (2.1) and the empirical estimates, we get D. The correlation between in ‡ation forecasts and the money-growth indicator Let ¹ ¼ t+T jt denote the "equilibrium" in ‡ation forecast (of four-quarter in ‡ation T quarters ahead), that is, the forecast conditional on the optimal reaction function (2.12) and the current state of the economy, X t . By (A.8)-(A.11), it is given by
where C j¢ denotes the jth row of the matrix C.
Let ¹ ¦ t+T jt (i t¡1 ) denote the "unchanged-interest-rate" in ‡ation forecast (of four-quarter in‡ation T¸1 quarters ahead), that is, the forecast conditional on an unchanged interest rate, i t+¿ = i t¡1 for ¿¸0, and the current state of the economy, X t . We note that i t¡1 = e 7 X t and de…neM´A
Then the unchanged-interest-rate forecast is given by
Furthermore, in equilibrium we can write
It follows that 
E. Nominal-GDP-growth targeting
Nominal-GDP-growth targeting requires expanding the vector of state variables by the four variables q t¡1 , q t¡2 , q t¡3 and q t¡4 . Then, the 19£1 vector X t of state variables, the 19£19
